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People choose where to live and how much to invest in housing. Traditionally, the first 
decision has been the domain of spatial economics, while the second has been analyzed 
in finance. Spatial asset pricing is an attempt to combine equilibrium concepts from both 
disciplines. In the finance context, we show how spatial decisions can be framed as an 
expanded portfolio problem. Within spatial economics, we identify the consequences of 
hedging motives for location decisions. We characterize a number of observable 
deviations from standard predictions in finance (e.g. the definition of the relevant market 
portfolio for the pricing of risk includes homeownership rates) and in spatial economics 
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Two strands of literature examine the demand for real estate assets. The urban economics
literature provides insights into the determinants of the allocation of households and eco-
nomic activity over space and the determinants of the cross-sectional distribution of land
rents. The ￿nance literature has focused primarily on real estate assets as a single asset ￿
housing ￿emphasizing some key characteristics such as the transaction costs associated with
the adjustment of housing ownership and the complementarity between the consumption of
housing and other commodities.
So far, these two literatures have evolved independently. The urban economics literature
abstracts from the stochastic nature of returns to land over time, the investment demand for
land, and any risk premium built into land prices. The ￿nance literature abstracts from the
spatial dimensions of real estate assets, the unique function of real estate as an ￿enabler￿for
human capital, and hence the endogenous determination of the cross-sectional distribution
of real estate dividends, namely, rents.
Here, we explore the gains from merging the two literatures. We bring portfolio choice
and asset pricing considerations to bear on location choice and the determination of real
estate rents, and vice versa. The results reveal an interaction between spatial equilibrium
and asset pricing, hence ￿spatial asset pricing.￿
We design a tractable model with closed-form solutions that are comparable to well-
established results in both ￿elds. We build on the standard spatial equilibrium assumption of
urban economics: Access to a location￿ s amenities including earning opportunities requires
consuming one unit of local land. We set this spatial equilibrium problem within a CARA-
normal portfolio choice and asset pricing framework.
In equilibrium, the spatial allocation of households is determined together with local
rents and the volatility of rents. The spatial allocation of households also determines the
weights of each location-speci￿c real estate asset in the market portfolio that is relevant for
the pricing of systematic risk. This portfolio does not include all assets in the economy;
the endogenously determined quantity of real estate assets used by households for hedging
purposes is not part of this portfolio. The spatial allocation of households therefore a⁄ects
the pricing of all assets.
At the same time, the pricing of assets in the economy matters for the spatial allocation
of households and thus the rents generated by real estate assets in each location. Therefore,
the cross-sectional distribution of rents re￿ ects not only the cross-sectional distribution of
the bene￿ts of each location but also the risk exposure of households in each location and
the price of risk.
2Our ￿ndings indicate it is not appropriate to summarize housing as a single aggregate
asset class for the pricing of housing and other assets, as is common in the ￿nance literature.
It is also inappropriate to assume rents re￿ ect the amenities of a location and ignore the
risk exposure of local households and the contribution of the location to systematic risk, as
is common in the urban economics literature.
Merging the two literatures yields a number of novel insights with regard to determinants
of the allocation of households across location, the cross-sectional and time series variations
of households￿portfolios, and the cross-sectional variation of returns to housing.
The model. There are four classes of assets: a risk-free bond, stocks, residential properties
in a number of locations, and non-transferrable human capital. As in standard asset pricing
models, agents may lend and borrow at the risk-free bond rate without any constraint.
Agents may also invest in stocks, de￿ned as claims over exogenous stochastic streams of
dividends. The dividend stream of residential properties, however, is determined endoge-
nously. Residential properties provide access to a stochastic production technology that is
speci￿c to their location. An agent￿ s human capital determines the expected level of his
or her earnings at each location and the covariance of earnings with the location-speci￿c
production technology. The distribution of individual characteristics across the population
is expressed in a general form.1
Properties di⁄er only in their location. The supply of houses is ￿xed in every location
but one, the countryside, where the supply is unlimited. Houses can be rented at the local
equilibrium market rate. They can be purchased or sold (even fractionally) at the local
equilibrium price. Agents may buy residential properties in every market. They also may
buy a home in their city, in which case they are homeowners.
There are no frictions on any of the asset markets; e.g., no credit constraints, no trans-
action costs for buying or renting, no limits to fractional ownership.
We want to obtain closed-form solutions and expressions that are comparable to standard
results obtained from mean-variance asset pricing models, so we assume an overlapping
generations structure with ￿nite life and constant population size. Agents have constant-
absolute risk-aversion preferences with in￿nite elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and
both city-productivity and stock-dividends stochastic shocks are normally distributed. We
do not impose any restrictions on the covariances between the stochastic processes driving
stock dividends and city-speci￿c technology shocks.
1In most of this work, we interpret local productivity as labor-related and hence translated into labor
earnings, but the model has an equivalent interpretation in terms of leisure, where productivity is understood
as the ability of the agent to enjoy local amenities. We also assume that there are no spillover e⁄ects across
agents; that is, the productivity of an agent depends on its location but not on who else lives in that location.
Later, we show that our characterization extends to a model with generic economies of agglomeration.
3Agents choose where to live at the beginning of their life. Living in a location requires
consuming one unit of housing in this location. While all investment decisions can be
revisited in every period, the location choice is irreversible (moving costs are in￿nite).2
Location security. Each location can be represented as a free ￿location security￿com-
posed of two parts: (1) a unit of location-speci￿c, agent-speci￿c human capital, which yields
a stream of stochastic bene￿ts, understood as wages or enjoyment of local amenities, and (2)
a unit of local housing , which requires a stream of stochastic rent payments, and satis￿es
the local housing consumption requirement.
The location decision and the portfolio allocation problem of an agent can therefore be
examined within the same dynamic optimization framework. Choosing a location amounts
to solving an expanded portfolio problem; that is, besides choosing ￿nancial assets, each
household must pick one unit of one location security. This characterization re￿ ects the
discreteness of the choice of location.
It should be obvious that when an agent moves to a city, he or she considers more
than the expected level of after-rent income; agents also take into account the amount of
systematic risk assumed upon choosing the combination of location-speci￿c human capital
and housing consumption. And, systematic risk depends on the equilibrium allocation of
agents across locations.
Spatial allocation. In equilibrium asset prices are relevant to the spatial allocation.
The reverse is true as well; the spatial allocation is relevant to asset prices. Rents are
determined by the productivity of marginal residents. Marginal residents are households
that are indi⁄erent between two or more locations. We demonstrate that our model admits
a set of hyper-marginal residents: households indi⁄erent among all locations, whether city
or countryside. These households are all age 1 as location choice takes place at age 1, once
and for all.
That a set of hyper-marginal households exists is due to the assumption that the dis-
tribution of personal characteristics has full support. Given an agent with particular char-
acteristics and a particular city, one can always ￿nd an agent with similar characteristics
but a slightly stronger or weaker preference for that given city. This continuity argument
implies that, given an equilibrium vector of prices and rents, there must be a hyper-marginal
agent.3
2The assumption that people cannot move is useful for tractability of analysis, but the assumption is not
necessary for results about the role of housing as a hedge. Sinai and Souleles (2009) provide evidence of the
empirical relevance of this phenomenon, accounting explicitly for US household moving patterns.
3A ancillary contribution of our work is to show existence in a spatial general equilibrium model with
an in￿nite number of types of agents. Available existence results in the literature use a di⁄erent approach
based on a ￿niteness (Grimaud and La⁄ont, 1989).
4Determining the set of hyper-marginal households is a key step to characterize the
equilibrium with stationary allocation of households across locations, linear housing rents
and asset prices. We conjecture a functional form for rents and prices and we verify the
validity of our guess. We build our guess by adapting standard results obtained in CARA-
normal portfolio choice frameworks.
It is through the hyper-marginal residents that productivity shocks are transmitted to
rents. A productivity shock in any location a⁄ects the expected utility of the hyper-marginal
residents if they move to that location, and hence a⁄ects the local rent. As in equilibrium
these residents are indi⁄erent among all locations, a local rent adjustment occurs to keep
them indi⁄erent. The indi⁄erence condition of the hyper-marginal resident pins down the
relative level of rents in di⁄erent locations. The fact that one location (the countryside) has
an unlimited supply of land determines the absolute level of rents.
The location decision of any agent is determined by comparing that agent￿ s location-
speci￿c set of productivity parameters with that of the hyper-marginal residents. By aggre-
gating the investment demand functions of all agents, we obtain the asset pricing formulas
both for real estate in di⁄erent locations and for stocks.
We are then in a position to verify that the initial conjecture about the hyper-marginal
resident is correct and that this it is indeed an equilibrium. We thus prove the existence of an
equilibrium where prices can be expressed as linear functions of the underlying parameters,
and the allocation of households across location remains constant over time. Uniqueness
can be proven in speci￿c cases.
Portfolio choice. Because we assume households choose their location at birth, marginal
residents are newborn households. As households age, we do not put any restriction on
the covariance of their current income with their income at birth. A changing covariance
exposes households to the risk that shocks to their income may not provide full insurance
for local productivity shocks that a⁄ect their housing costs.
The optimal investment portfolio of every agent is characterized as a combination of two
components: (1) An investment in local real estate that depends on the agent￿ s exposure
to local productivity shocks, and (2) a portfolio of stocks and residential properties, with
identical weights across agents. The ￿rst component is a manifestation of home bias. An
agent who does not own property in the city of residence is vulnerable to a combination of
local productivity shocks and rent ￿ uctuations (determined endogenously). This risk can be
hedged away by an appropriate holding of local real estate. This hedging demand depends
on the covariance between the agent￿ s earnings and local equilibrium rents.
Asset pricing. All households are able to fully insure themselves with some ownership
5stake in their local housing markets. Conditional on this purchase, they are all identical
with regard to risk. Hence they all have the same investment demand for the remaining
securities in the economy: the portfolio made up of all stocks and residential properties
in the economy minus the homes held for hedging purposes. Let us call this portfolio the
adjusted market portfolio.
Equilibrium requires that the price of all assets in the economy be such that total
investment demand (beyond the hedging demand for homes) equals the adjusted market
portfolio. All assets are therefore priced in this adjusted market portfolio.
The fact that the quantity of homes in each location in the adjusted market portfolio
is determined endogenously, adds a channel whereby the spatial allocation of households
a⁄ects the prices of all assets. The spatial allocation of households does more than determine
the stochastic properties of the rents in each location; it also determines what assets are
part of the portfolio that is relevant to pricing systematic risk in equilibrium.
The adjusted market portfolio includes all ￿nancial assets and housing in every location.
The prices of stocks are therefore determined not only by how their dividends co-vary with
those of other ￿nancial assets but also by how they co-vary with earnings of the hyper-
marginal residents in each location. Note that the relevant information for asset pricing
related to the presence of housing in the economy cannot be represented by a single aggregate
housing good.
Implications. Our portfolio choice and asset pricing expressions specify only objects ￿
such as prices and covariances ￿that are in principle observable. We can thus develop a
number of empirical questions linking spatial and ￿nancial variables:
Home bias. In our model, agents face no transaction costs and can invest in real estate
anywhere in the world. Still, they tend to invest a large fraction of their wealth in local
real estate for the hedging reasons that we have noted. A simple numerical exercise shows
that the home bias can lead to purchase of up to 40% of a housing unit. The home bias
in real estate is usually attributed to transaction costs, tax distortions, or psychological
components. Our model shows that more of a hedging motive may be signi￿cant and
provides a simple tool to compute its e⁄ect.
Homeownership over the life-cycle. Under reasonable assumptions, our model yields a
hump-shaped demand for ownership over the life-cycle. Suppose that, as agents get older,
their income covaries less with the income of newcomers to their city. This implies that
agents need to purchase an increasing amount of local housing for hedging purposes as they
get older. Counter to this e⁄ect is the fact that as agents get older, the time left to live
6is shortened and so their demand for insurance declines. We show that the combination of
these two e⁄ects can yield an inverted U-shape.
Cross-sectional dispersion of housing returns. Di⁄erences in real estate returns across
locations depend on di⁄erences in the average within-location covariance of the income of
each resident with the income of the current and future marginal residents. For instance, in
a one-company town, wages of all cohorts are highly correlated with rents; residents there
do not demand local housing for hedging purposes, and prices are depressed.
Allocation of agents across cities. The allocation of agents across cities does not maximize
aggregate expected production. When they choose a location, agents trade o⁄ expected
net earnings opportunities (expected wage minus expected rents) against risk exposure
(volatility of income minus rent). Agents therefore do not necessarily choose the location
that maximizes their output. They may prefer a location with lower expected earnings
minus rents if their income in that location is less correlated with rents. In such a location,
the purchase of local housing provides insurance bene￿ts. Nevertheless, they earn a risk
premium on the local housing because it is priced by outsiders to whom the volatility of
housing returns is a risk, not an insurance. An obvious corollary is that people are reluctant
to move to a one-company town.
Asset pricing errors. We can construct and price aggregate indices of stocks and real estate
assets. It is also possible to quantify the error that we make if we price stocks according to
a classic beta (taking into account only the covariance with other stocks), rather than the
correct beta, which is based on stocks and the portion of housing assets not demanded by
local residents, and on the covariance of stock dividends with labor earnings of the marginal
residents in every city.
Extensions. The analytical results we obtain for the benchmark model support two useful
extensions in the modeling of locations and housing assets.
First, the benchmark model can be extended to encompass economies of agglomeration
and other forms of externalities among residents. The equilibrium characterization of the
benchmark model remains valid, but the presence of direct externalities ampli￿es the possi-
bility of equilibrium multiplicity. If the agglomeration economies are strong enough, there
will be multiple linear stationary equilibria corresponding to di⁄erent allocations of talent
across cities. This means we may be able to create links between real estate ￿nance and
the vast literature on agglomeration e⁄ects.
Second, the benchmark model assumes the ownership of real estate is perfectly divisible.
Households are allowed to buy exactly the amount of local housing they need to perfectly
7hedge their risk in income minus rent. A number of frictions are likely to lead household
away from the perfect hedge investment; e.g., a preference for homeownership, preferential
tax treatment of homeownership, housing transaction costs, housing property indivisibilities.
Any such impediment to obtaining a perfect hedge with local housing leads households to
resort to exploiting the covariance between their local risk and each of the ￿nancial assets.
Agents in di⁄erent location therefore purchase a di⁄erent portfolio of housing and stocks.
This hedging demand for stocks ends up a⁄ecting stock prices. As a case in point, we
propose explicit solutions for stock prices when all households are required to own their
home.4
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 sets out the model. Section 4 presents the main equilibrium characterization result,
through three propositions corresponding to: portfolio allocation (Proposition 1), asset
pricing (Proposition 2), and location choice (Proposition 4). Section 5 uses the main result
to discuss a number of related issues. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This is ￿to the best of our knowledge ￿the ￿rst asset pricing model where location choices,
housing rents, and asset prices are endogenous.
Our work is perhaps closest in spirit to that of DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004).
They consider an economy with multiple communities and local goods as well as a global
good. In this dynamic setting, some agents (the laborers) are endowed with human capital
that will be used to produce local goods in future periods, but they are currently subject to
borrowing constraints. Other agents (the investors) own shares in ￿rms that produce the
global good.
This approach yields a number of powerful results. Investors care about their relative
wealth in the community because they bid for scarce local goods. This generates an exter-
nality in portfolio choice, which leads to the potential presence of multiple equilibria (in the
stable equilibria, investors display a strong home bias). And, if there is a behavioral bias,
this externality ampli￿es the bias through the portfolio decisions of rational investors.
Our model di⁄ers from DeMarzo et al. (2004) in a number of important dimensions:
(1) Our local good does not produce utility directly, but it enables agents to realize their
human capital potential; (2) our spatial allocation is endogenous; and (3) there are no credit
4Other extensions yield similar predictions with regard to home bias. Suppose households enjoy more
utility from the same property if they own it than if they rent it. Such an assumption implies that their
investment in local housing is not driven purely by hedging considerations. Households are willing to
￿distort￿their housing investment because of consumption bene￿ts. It then becomes optimal to use stocks
to deal with any residual risk in income minus rent not canceled with local housing investment.
8constraints. We do share their goal of studying the properties of portfolio choice and asset
pricing under uncertainty in the presence of community e⁄ects. As in their model, a home
bias arises in equilibrium because of a hedging motive.5
Our contribution to the real estate ￿nance literature, lies in endogenizing both price and
rent in a dynamic model with multiple locations.6
Grossman and Laroque (1991) characterize optimal consumption and portfolio selection
when households derive utility from a single durable good only and trading the durable
require payment of a transaction cost. They show that CAPM holds in this environment,
but CCAPM fails because consumption of housing is not a smooth function of wealth due
to transaction costs.
Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) expand on the Grossman and Laroque framework by as-
suming that households derive utility not only from housing but also from numeraire con-
sumption. They show that when housing asset returns do not co-vary with stock returns,
the CCAPM holds. In equilibrium, all households hold a single optimal portfolio of risky
￿nancial assets. Depending on their holding of housing, households vary in how much of
their wealth is invested in this portfolio but not its composition.
An extensive literature has explored the e⁄ect of housing consumption on households￿
life-cycle overall consumption and investment behavior. An early paper by Henderson and
Ioannides (1983) considers an optimal consumption and saving problem when a household
chooses whether to own or rent, and a wedge arises endogenously between the cost of renting
and the cost of owning. Henderson and Ioannides show that the consumption demand for
homeownership distorts households￿investment decisions.
Goetzmann (1993) and Brueckner (1997) explain how this distortion a⁄ects households￿
portfolio choice. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) compute mean-variance optimal portfolios
for homeowners using U.S. data on housing and ￿nancial asset returns.7 Cocco (2004) also
computes optimal portfolios but in a calibrated dynamic model of household consumption
and portfolio choice. Housing consumption is constrained to equal housing investment in
the two papers above.
Yao and Zhang (2005) introduce discrete tenure choice (rent or own total housing con-
5Our results on home bias are also related to the international ￿nance literature on the home bias
puzzle (Stockman and Dellas, 1989), but we di⁄er in our focus on real estate and in that location choice is
endogenous in our model.
6A review of the empirical literature on the cross-sectional dispersion of housing prices is beyond the
scope of this paper. For recent evidence emphasizing variations in housing price premiums see Campbell et
al. (2009).
7Englund, Hwang, and Quigley (2002) report similar computations for Sweden, Iacoviello and Ortalo-
MagnØ (2003) for the U.K., and LeBlanc and Lagarenne (2004) for France. Note that every one of these
papers considers the stock market as a whole and so ignores the covariance between housing and speci￿c
stocks.
9sumption) in a similar environment. They show the sensitivity of households￿portfolio
choice to tenure mode; owning a house leads households to reduce the proportion of eq-
uity investment in their net worth (a substitution e⁄ect). At the same time, households
choose stocks more than bonds in their portfolio because homeownership provides insurance
against equity returns and labor-income ￿ uctuations (a diversi￿cation bene￿t).
All this research demonstrates that incorporating housing consumption in portfolio
choice models helps reconcile theoretical predictions and cross-sectional observations. Home
investment seems a key factor in explaining the very limited participation of the young in
equity markets. Credit constraints play a critical role in explaining the hump-shaped we
see in home ownership over the life-cycle.
Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) study a consumption-based asset pricing model in
which housing rents and prices are determined endogenously; the quantity of housing follows
an exogenous stochastic process. Agents can invest in both housing and stocks. The focus
of their analysis is on the composition risk related to ￿ uctuations in the share of housing in
the households￿consumption baskets. Piazzesi et al. show that the housing share can be
used to forecast excess returns of stocks ￿a prediction that appears to be borne out by the
data.
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) propose a mechanism whereby the amount of
housing wealth in the economy a⁄ects the ability of households to insure idiosyncratic
income risk and thus shifts the market price of risky assets, housing included. In Lustig
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), the authors present empirical evidence of the relevance of
the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth for returns of stocks. We share with Piazzesi
et al. (2005) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005, 2007) a focus on the equilibrium
properties of housing rents and the risk premiums.
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) consider risk sharing across regions. Empirical
evidence indicates that the amount of housing wealth in a region a⁄ects the sensitivity
of local consumption to local income. This paper is particularly close to ours in that it
considers multiple locations. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, however, assume exogenous
location choice and that housing supply is perfectly elastic in all locations (and hence rents
depend only on aggregate shocks).
Our approach to the modeling of housing as access to a location is in the tradition of
urban economics. Our location choice model follows the standard multi-cities framework of
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), where residential properties provide access to the local
labor market, and locations are di⁄erentiated by potential surplus. As in Rosen and Roback
and the many more recent papers that build on this framework (e.g., Gyourko and Tracy,
1991, Kahn, 1995, Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), we assume households face a unit housing
10consumption requirement and derive utility from consumption of numeraire only.
Because we are concerned with portfolio choice in a dynamic environment, we assume
households are risk-averse. Risk aversion in the face of stochastic streams of income and rent
provides a motivation for ownership of local residential properties ￿homeownership ￿in our
model. This approach builds on the work of Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2002), Hilber (2005),
Sinai and Souleles (2005, 2009), and Davido⁄ (2006) and others who provide evidence of
the relevance of such motivation for housing investment.
We do not here review the vast literature concerned with the determinants of housing
prices. Typically in this literature, real estate prices are determined by a perfectly elastic
supply function (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2008) or by a perfectly elastic demand
function (Davis and Heathcote, 2005, Davis and Ortalo-MagnØ, forthcoming, Gyourko,
Mayer and Sinai, 2006, Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov, 2007, Van Nieuwerburgh and
Weil, 2007).
3 Model
Consider an overlapping generation economy where a mass 1 of agents is born in every
period. Each agent in the t-cohort is born at the beginning of period t, lives for S periods,
and dies at the beginning of period t + S. Hence, at every time t, there are a mass S of
agents alive in the economy.
3.1 Geography
There are L cities, denoted by index l = 1;:::;L and a countryside denoted by index l = 0.
City l has an exogenously given mass of houses. Let nl be the mass of houses per cohort
that will be active on the housing market so that total supply of housing in city l equals








Each house accommodates exactly one agent.
113.2 Production
The income of a person who lives in the countryside is (normalized to) zero. Productivity






t is a random variable, independently and identically distributed across time.
At birth, each agent draws:
￿ A vector of city-speci￿c endowment surplus, " = ["l]l=1;:::;L, with "l 2 (￿1;1).





s 2 [0;1]. Assume ￿l
0 = 0 for all l.
The parameters (";￿) are i.i.d. across generations. Their joint distribution within a
generation takes the general form ￿(";￿), with the only requirement that it should be
continuous and have full support.

















for s = 0;:::;S ￿ 1 (note the di⁄erence between yl




an individual speci￿c variable).
Hence, the income of each agent can be decomposed into a permanent part, which
captures the initial productivity of the agent in a location and a time-dependent part,
which is determined by the local productivity shocks in the city and that agent￿ s sensitivity
to the city￿ s shocks. We call "l the city-agent e⁄ect and ￿l
s the shock insulation e⁄ect.
We represent below the income earned by an agent born at time t, living in city l, for





























































Similar formulations determine the agent￿ s earnings until reaching age S￿1.8 At age S, the
8The structure of " and ￿ could be more complex and still be amenable to analysis in our mean-variance
set-up. For instance, we could say that the city-agent e⁄ect is not constant over the life of the agent but
rather it follows a random walk. Also, we could assume that the extent to which a shock that occurs at age
s a⁄ect future incomes depends on the age of the agent.
12agent does not earn anything. It is mathematically convenient to set ￿S = 0 for all agents
even if it is irrelevant to the agents￿earnings.
The city-agent e⁄ect, ￿l, is a standard object in multi-city models with heterogeneous
agents. Depending on their human capital, agents face di⁄erent earning opportunities in
di⁄erent locations.
The shock-insulation e⁄ect, ￿l, captures two economic phenomena. First, agents may be
exposed to a technological cohort-speci￿c e⁄ect (documented by Goldin and Katz, 1998).
The human capital of certain people, especially the young, may be more ￿ exible. When a
technological innovation appears, the income of certain agents will be more a⁄ected than
the income of others.
Second, certain agents ￿like senior workers and public sector workers ￿may be part of
an implicit labor insurance agreement. Their wages are more insulated from productivity
shocks.
It is reasonable ￿but not necessary for the analysis ￿to assume that the insulation
parameter, for a shock that occurs at a given age, increases with in the age of the agent:
￿l
s+1 > ￿l
s. The two extreme cases are full insulation (￿l
s = 1) and full exposure (￿l
s = 0). 9
For concreteness, we interpret yl
t;t+s as monetary income, but there is an alternative
interpretation in terms of non-monetary bene￿ts that is equivalent from a mathematical
standpoint. The term yl
t;t+s can be viewed as a money-equivalent of the utility a⁄orded by
the amenities present in location l. The utility can be decomposed in turn into an agent-
city e⁄ect (a preference for that particular location) and a shock component (perhaps an
environmental or a social risk) multiplied by the agent￿ s sensitivity to that type of shock. Of
course, the model can also be interpreted as a mix of monetary and non-monetary bene￿ts.
An agent who lives and thus produces in city l, must rent exactly one unit of housing
in city l.
3.3 Housing market
The housing market is frictionless. There are no transaction costs associated with renting,
buying, or selling property. There is no di⁄erence between living in an owned or a rented
house.
At birth, every agent chooses in what city (or the countryside) to live. The agent
cannot move afterward. Living in city l at time t entails paying the market rent, on a unit
of housing, rl
t. Rents are determined in equilibrium.
9We ￿nd it natural to restrict ￿
l
s to be between zero and one, but our mathematical analysis is valid
even if ￿
l
s > 1 (the agent￿ s productivity is negatively correlated with local shocks) and ￿
l
s < 0 (the agent is
overexposed to local shocks).
13Agents may invest in divisible shares of any city￿ s housing stock and revise their decision
at every period. Let al
t;t+s denote the amount of housing of city l owned by an agent born
at time t of age s.
The market price of a unit of housing in city l at time t is pl
t. The agent revises his or her
housing investment at the beginning of every period. For accounting purposes, imagine that
the agent liquidates all housing assets and then buys the desired amount in each period.
At the beginning of period t + s, the agent acquires al
t;t+s units in city l at total cost
al
t;t+spl
t+s. During period t, the agent collects rent on the housing investment for a total of
al
t;t+srl
t+s. At the beginning of the next period, the agent liquidates the housing investment
and receives al
t;t+spl








Besides housing, there is another class of securities called stocks. These are claims on
productive assets, that ￿as in regular asset pricing models ￿produce an exogenous stochastic
stream of income. There are Szk units of type-k asset, with k 2 f1;:::;Kg and zk > 0. A
unit of stock k produces dividend dk





where ￿ is i.i.d. across time with probability distribution as below.
As is the case for housing, every agent can buy units of every stock and revise port-
folio allocations in every period. The market price of stock k at a particular time is qk
t .
At the beginning of period t + s, the agent acquires bk
t;t+s units of stock k at total cost
bk
t;t+sqk
t+s. During period t + s, the agent receives dividends on investment in k for a total
of bk
t;t+sdk
t+s. At the beginning of the next period, the agent liquidates the stock investment
and receives bk
t;t+sqk







3.5 Distribution of random shocks
There are two sources of exogenous shocks in our economy: a vector ￿ of local productivity
shocks, and a vector ￿ of dividend shocks. The shocks are independently and identically
distributed over time, according to a normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix
￿: (￿t;￿t) ￿ N (0;￿).
10Given the frictionless nature of the housing market, derivative securities would be super￿ uous. In
particular, Case-Shiller home price indices for our cities (a security bought at time t which pays a price p
l
t+1
at time t+1) would be equivalent to purchasing housing for one period, net of the ￿rent coupon.￿Given the
random-walk nature of all our shocks, long-term securities are also redundant because they can be replicated
by sequences of short-term investments. This includes long-term rentals or futures on real estate.
14We do not impose any restriction on the correlation between local productivity shocks
and dividends. One industry may be more a⁄ected by shocks in a certain market, and
vice versa. We also do not impose any restriction on the correlation of productivity shocks
across cities.
3.6 Consumption and savings
As our goal is to develop a closed-form expression for asset prices, we assume that agents
derive CARA utility ￿exp(￿￿w) from wealth at the end of their life, w, where ￿ is the
standard risk-aversion parameter.
Agents face no credit constraints and can borrow and lend freely at discount rate ￿ 2
(0;1). For simplicity, we assume that agents are born with no wealth (this does not a⁄ect
their decisions, given that they have CARA preferences).
3.7 Non-negativity constraints
Asset pricing models with normally distributed shocks su⁄er from a well-known technical
problem. As the value of dividends can become negative, agents may want to dispose of
assets they own. If they could, the distribution of asset values would no longer be normal,
and the model would not be tractable. Hence, all models in this class assume, implicitly
or explicitly, that agents cannot dispose of assets. Typically, this assumption is unrealistic
because in practice both agents and ￿rms are protected by limited liability. Instead, in the
model stocks can have negative prices, and their owners must pay to get rid of them.
Our CARA-normal framework inherits this non-negativity problem. That is, produc-
tivity in a city could become negative, and house prices there may be negative.11
The usual response to this criticism, which applies here as well, is that the unconstrained
model should be viewed as an approximation of the model with non-negativity constraints,
as long as the starting values are su¢ ciently far from zero.
3.8 Timing
The order of moves for an agent born at time t is as follows:
1. At birth, the agent chooses in which location l to spend the rest of his or her life.
2. At the beginning of each period t + 0;:::;t + S, the agent learns the values of the
random shocks for that period, ￿t+s and ￿t+s.
11We assume homeowners have an obligation to rent their property (they pay a ￿ne if it is vacant).
153. For s = 0;:::;S￿1, the agent revises housing and stock investments (at;t+s and bt;t+s),
pays rent rl
t+s for one unit of housing in the chosen location and collects dividends
and rents on the assets owned.
4. At time t+S, the agent liquidates all investments (at;t+S￿1 and bt;t+S￿1) and consumes
all wealth before death.12
4 Analysis
An equilibrium is an allocation of households across cities, a vector of optimal portfolio
holdings of housing and stocks for each agent, housing rents and prices for each city, and
stock prices such that: (1) The location choice and portfolio holdings solve the agents￿
problem; (2) the housing markets (space and ownership) in each city clear; and (3) the
stock markets clear.
A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium where the mass of agents of a generation t
who live in a given city l is the same across generations.13
A linear equilibrium is an equilibrium where stock prices, rents, and house prices can






t ￿ ￿ qk (1)
rl
t = yl






t ￿ ￿ pl (3)
where ￿ q =
￿
￿ qk￿k=1;:::;K and ￿ p =
￿
￿ pl￿l=1;:::;L are price discounts; and ￿ r =
￿
￿ rl￿l=1;:::;L is a rent
premium to be determined in equilibrium. The rent is equal to local productivity plus a
local constant. House and stock prices are equal to the discounted value of a perpetuity
that pays the current rent or dividend minus an asset-speci￿c discount.
Price discounts can also be interpreted as expected returns of zero-cost portfolios.14
Throughout the analysis we describe ￿ pl and ￿ qk as price discounts or expected returns,
depending on the context.
12The agent does not work or pay rent in the last period of life (t + S) but rather consumes all wealth at
the beginning of the period before death.
13A non-stationary equilibrium be structured as follows. As agents cannot move after they locate to city
l, the stock of rented accommodation used by the t-cohort will not become available until members of the
t-cohort die at the end of t + S. Hence, if the t-cohort is, say, overrepresented, the t + S + 1-cohort will be
equally overrepresented. The non-stationary equilibria are characterized by cycles of length S + 1.
14For instance, the expected return of a zero-cost one-unit portfolio invested in housing in city l (evaluated
























t + ￿ p
l = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p
l:
16Our strategy for ￿nding equilibria is as follows. We start by conjecturing that we are in
a stationary linear equilibrium. We postulate a feasible allocation of agents to cities, and
we solve the portfolio problem of a generic agent living in a given city. As it turns out,
solving this agent problem is enough to characterize stock prices and house prices up to a
vector of city-speci￿c constants. With this information, we compute the expected utility
of every agent, conditional on city choice. We determine aggregate location demand, given
any price vector by comparing expected utilities across cities.
Finally, we consider the marginal residents. We show that for every vector of city-
speci￿c constants there are a set of agents who are indi⁄erent among all locations (the
hyper-marginal residents), while all others have strict preferences. The characteristics of
the hyper-marginal residents are monotonic in the vector of city-speci￿c constants, and we
can identify the hyper-marginal residents so that the mass of agents who move to each city
equals the local housing supply in each city. This proves that our initial conjecture on linear
prices is correct.15

















Proposition 1 re-writes the two components of the agents utility and uses them to compute
his optimal portfolio choice and his expected utility.
In what follows we focus on one agent and we drop the argument representing the
agent-speci￿c characteristics: (";￿). All proofs are in appendix.
Proposition 1 (Portfolio Allocation) Suppose that prices and rents are given by equa-
tions (1), (2), and (3), with given ￿ r, ￿ q and ￿ p. Consider any allocation of agents to cities.
Consider an agent born at period t characterized by a vector " and a matrix ￿. If this agent
lives in l and chooses investment pro￿les [at;t+s;bt;t+s]s=0;:::;S￿1, the expectation and the
15It is tempting to consider the two ￿rst parts of the analysis (portfolio choice and asset pricing) in
isolation, but they are valid only if the third part is present too. If one assumes a di⁄erent location model
or an exogenous allocation of agents to cities, the three price processes in equations (1), (2), and (3) would
be di⁄erent, and Propositions 1 and 2 would no longer hold. For instance, if agents could move between
cities during their lifetime, it is not clear that the rent the price in city l would depend only on productivity
in city l.
We see this as both a weakness and a strength of spatial asset pricing. On the one hand, one cannot have
a meaningful discussion about real estate prices in multiple locations without an underlying spatial model.
On the other hand, this opens the door to a wealth of testable implications related to spatial and ￿nancial
variables.













































































































Proposition 1 says that the optimal portfolio of any agent can be decomposed into:
￿ Demand for real estate in the city where the agent lives,
￿
al




a desire to hedge shocks to disposable income due to rent ￿ uctuations. As the price
of a house is linear in the rent, a house in a certain city is a perfect hedge against





Hence, the hedging demand depends on how well the agent is insulated from local
productivity shocks at time t. The hedging demand varies across agents and across
time for a given agent, but it does not depend on the expected return of real estate in
that city (if a city has a high return, that will be re￿ ected in the mutual fund share
only).16
￿ Investment in a mutual fund includes all stocks and houses in all cities, with weights
(~ a;b). The mutual fund is the same for all agents. All agents within a cohort buy
the same amount of mutual fund shares (but older agents buy more shares, purely
because of the discount rate ￿). Given a vector of expected returns (which for now is
still exogenous), the weights (~ a;b) that the mutual fund puts on various stocks and
real estate assets are given by a standard CAPM allocation. The portfolio puts more
weight on an asset if its returns are less correlated with other assets and have a higher
expected value.
16Davis and Willen (2000) obtain a related result (their Proposition 1) in decomposition of the optimal
portfolio of agents who face labor risk into a speculative component and a hedging component.
18Now that we have solved the portfolio allocation problem for any given vector of pre-
miums, we solve for the equilibrium expected returns. Denote any (measurable) allocation
of agents to cities with the indicator function Il
";￿, which takes a value of 1 if agents with




for all " and ￿).
Proposition 2 (Asset Pricing) Suppose that rents are given by equation (2), with given
￿ r. Consider any allocation of agents over space so that all cities are populated. Then, prices


































Houses and stocks are priced according to their contribution to systematic risk by a
classic CAPM formula. Proposition 2 ￿nds the correct de￿nition of systematic risk for this
model. The weights of stocks in the market portfolio correspond to the quantity of stocks
available, as in the regular CAPM. The weights of real estate, however, are reduced by the
total hedging demand. Namely, the weight of houses in city l is equal to the mass of homes
nl minus the integral of the hedging demand by residents of l: Rl.
To explore the pricing expressions in Proposition 2 further, de￿ne the adjusted market
portfolio M as a portfolio allocation that includes
nl ￿ Rl
Q
units of housing in city l for every city l;and
zk
Q








k=1 zk. The mutual fund that all agents buy is the adjusted
market portfolio.
Denote the expectation and the variance of the adjusted market portfolio, respectively,
by ￿ pM and V ar(M). De￿ne Cov (l;M) as the covariance between the return of real estate
in city l and the return of M. For every stock k, de￿ne Cov (k;M) similarly. Then:










The expression in the Corollary is akin to the classic CAPM pricing formula where
Cov(l;M)
V ar(M) is a beta-factor for housing in city l. The main innovation lies in identi￿cation of
the adjusted market portfolio, for which this formula is true.17
Propositions 1 and 2 are really intermediate results. They rest on a speci￿c conjecture
about the stochastic process that determines local market rents, described in equation (2).
But rents are not primitives, and we must now check that for the location model used here
the conjecture is in fact correct. It is useful to reiterate that the conjecture would in general
not extend to other location models, implying that Propositions 1 and 2 are valid only if
accompanied by the speci￿c spatial allocation model that we have chosen.
Besides closing the ￿xed-point argument, we also need to determine the vector of rent
premiums ￿ r, and to ￿nd the vector of hedging demands R.
For an agent with personal characteristics (";￿), the log-utility of locating in city l is
given by U in Proposition 1, where now ￿ p and ￿ q are de￿ned in terms of primitives through
Proposition 2. For every (";￿), let
￿ ul (";￿) ￿ "l +
(1 ￿ ￿)
2







with the utility of being in the countryside: ￿ u0 (";￿) = ￿ u0.18
Also let














Then, we can write the utility of locating in city l as:19







￿ ul (";￿) ￿ ￿ rl
￿￿
:
Namely, the agent￿ s utility can be decomposed into a component that is common to all
agents (and depends on investment in the mutual fund) and an agent-speci￿c component
that depends on the city-agent e⁄ect "l and the shock-insulation vector ￿l that the agent
faces if the choice is to locate in city l.
17For instance, if one de￿nes the market portfolio without the ￿R correction, such a beta representation
would not be valid.
18Assuming that "
0 = 0 is without loss of generality. If it was not, one could rede￿ne all the " as di⁄erences
with "
0.







































20A given agent locates in city l if and only if Ul = maxm Um. For every L-vector ^ r, we
can write the aggregate demand for location l as
￿l (^ r) =
Z
(";￿):￿ ul(";￿)￿^ rl=maxm(￿ um(";￿)￿^ rm)
￿(";￿)d(";￿):
We obtain:
Proposition 4 (Location Choice) A linear stationary equilibrium exists. In it, an agent
with personal characteristics (";￿) locates in city l if and only if
￿ ul (";￿) ￿ ￿ rl = max
j=0;:::L
￿
￿ uj (";￿) ￿ ￿ rj￿
and ￿ r is the unique value of the vector ^ r such that ￿l (^ r) = nl in all cities.




t + ￿ rl:
Proposition 4 validates the conjectures that allowed us to obtain Propositions 1 and 2.
The most important step in Proposition 4 is determination of the identity of hyper-marginal
residents (the agents who are indi⁄erent among all locations including the countryside). As
we argue below, a key property of our set-up is that the characteristics of the hyper-marginal
residents are constant over time. The indi⁄erence conditions for these agents determine
market rents. This means that the local rent processes are the same, but for a constant
term, as the local productivity processes. This validates the linearity assumption for the
rent process built into equation (2).
Let us retrace, at an intuitive level, the steps that lead to Proposition 4. Despite the
fact that the payo⁄of an agent in a given city is determined by S+1 parameters ("l plus the
vector ￿l), the expected utility Ul of the agent in that city can be condensed into a simple
expression including ￿ ul (";￿). For any possible vector of rents ^ r, the demand function ￿l (^ r)
establishes how many agents will live in each location.
Hence, for every vector of rent constants ^ r, we identify a set of measure zero of hyper-
marginal residents such that their expected utility is the same in every city and in the
countryside:
￿ ul (";￿) ￿ ^ rl = ￿ u0 for all l:
Note that this correspond to multiple personal characteristic pro￿les: all the vectors (";￿)
that yield the same ￿ ul (";￿). One can show that the vector of expected utilities of the
hyper-marginal resident in di⁄erent location is monotonic in the rent constant vector ^ r.
This means that the mapping can be inverted. Given the identity of the hyper-marginal
21resident, there is only one vector of rents that guarantees that the hyper-marginal residents
are indeed indi⁄erent across all locations.
The assumption that the distribution of individual characteristics ￿(";￿) has full sup-
port guarantees that the demand function is continuous. As the hyper-marginal residents
determine the vector of location demands, one can ￿nd a set of hyper-marginal residents
that guarantees that demand equals supply in every location. This set is associated with
the rent constant vector ￿ r.
In equilibrium, we have that housing demand equals housing supply on the space market
in every city:
￿ (￿ r) = n;
and that the identity of the hyper-marginal residents is given by the set of values (";￿) so
that, given the equilibrium rent vector, their expected utility is the same in every city and
in the countryside:
￿ ul (";￿) ￿ ￿ rl = 0 for all l:
A key feature of our location equilibrium is that the characteristics of the hyper-marginal
resident are cohort-invariant. It is this feature that guarantees that the rent process is linear
and that our equilibrium characterization is valid. If, for instance, agents could change city,
the time-invariance property would not hold, and the rent process would not be linear. As
a result, the properties of portfolio allocation and asset prices would di⁄er.
We view this as a strength of spatial asset pricing models. The underlying geographic
model ￿which we can potentially observe through demographic and labor data ￿a⁄ects
equilibrium in the asset market.
The issue of uniqueness is complex. Obviously, there can be non-linear and/or non-
stationary equilibria. Given an allocation of residents to cities, there is only one linear
stationary equilibrium. There could be multiple spatial equilibria, however. The agent￿ s
expected utility in equation (4) includes a multiplicative term ￿ pl￿l
s. As Proposition 2 shows,
the real estate return ￿ pl depends on Rl and hence on who lives in city l, which creates a non-
trivial ￿xed-point problem. The (economically interesting) possibility remains that there
are multiple allocations of residents to cities that give rise to linear stationary equilibrium.
Uniqueness can be achieved under certain functional assumptions, as some examples
illustrate.
While we obtained closed-form solutions for portfolio decisions and asset premiums,
Proposition 4 does not express rents in closed form. This is natural as the probability
distribution over individual characteristics, ￿(";￿), is left in a general form. By making
speci￿c assumptions over personal characteristics and geography, one can obtain closed-form
expressions for all variables, as the following example illustrates.
22Assume that:
￿ Agents in each cohort draw city-speci￿c endowments " from a uniform distribution
de￿ned over [0;1]
L.






￿ All cities are of the same size: nl = 1
LN for every l, with N 2 (0;1).
Proposition 5 An agent with human capital " locates in city l if: (1) "l = maxm "m; and
(2) "l ￿ (1 ￿ N)
1
L. The equilibrium rent in city l is












If there are only two cities (L = 2), we can provide a two-dimensional representation of
the equilibrium allocation. If, for instance, we assume that n1 = n2 = 1
3 (and hence n0 ￿ 1
3),
we have the situation depicted in Figure 1. The agents who locate in the countryside are
those with a low "1 and a low "2 (the bottom left square region). Those who locate in city
1 have "1 ￿ (1 ￿ N)
1
2 and "1 ￿ "2 (bottom right trapezoid). Those who locate in city 2
have "2 ￿ (1 ￿ N)
1
2 and "2 ￿ "1. The marginal resident is found at the intersection of those
three regions.
We can also see what happens when cities have di⁄erent sizes. The general characteri-
zation is more complex than the one in Proposition 5, but one can work out examples. For
instance, if n1 = 2
9 and n2 = 4
9 (and a measure 1
3 of agents still locate in the countryside),
the allocation is depicted in Figure 2. The city-1 region is now smaller and the city-2 region
is larger. The hyper-marginal residents are now to the southeast of the hyper-marginal













23Another simple case assumes there is only one city, and agents di⁄er on two dimensions:
" and ￿. Suppose both types are uniformly (and independently) distributed on [0;1]. This






In Figure 3, there are values for ￿ so that agents with a low ￿ locate in the countryside,
and agents with a high ￿ locate in the city. Agents with a high ￿ are more insulated from
city-level technology shocks. They buy more housing for hedging purposes than agents
with a low ￿. They earn the risk premium on their housing investment although for them
it provides insurance. This bene￿t that comes from living in the city is not available to
agents with a low ￿ who purchase less housing for hedging purposes.
5 Discussion
Our spatial asset pricing model yields a rich set of implications linking spatial and ￿nan-
cial variables. We ￿rst discuss cross-sectional and life-cycle implications, and then talent
allocation across cities. We explore the pricing of portfolios of stocks and portfolios of real
estate. We conclude with a short discussion of how the model can be extended to include
economies of agglomeration and frictions in the housing market.
5.1 Returns on housing across cities
Our model yields predictions about the cross-sectional di⁄erences in real estate returns
(Proposition 2 and Corollary 3). To get some understanding of those predictions, consider
a simple benchmark. Assume that shocks across cities are uncorrelated, and suppose there




l . Proposition 2 yields










The expected return of housing in city l is an increasing function of the variance of shocks
in that city and of the outstanding real estate stock nl￿Rl. In turn, the latter is a declining
function of the average housing demand for hedging purposes, Rl, in that city. The value
of Rl is determined in equilibrium.
If a location specializes in an industry and thus o⁄ers low shock-insulation parameters.
All residents, whether old or young, are a⁄ected by industry productivity shocks in the same
way. The residents have a low demand for housing for hedging purposes. The city￿ s home-
ownership rate is low, and so are prices. The opposite, a city centered around an industry
with high shock-insulation parameters ￿perhaps a high-tech industry where older workers
struggle to keep up with innovation or a highly protected sector, where older workers face
implicit insurance ￿will display a high hedging demand for housing, high homeownership
rates, and high housing prices compared to rents.
5.2 Home ownership over the life-cycle
The model yields intertemporal predictions on individual home ownership rates. We know
from Proposition 1 that housing demand for hedging purposes depends on the shock-
insulation parameter, which in turn varies with age. The hedging demand by someone








Suppose the parameters ￿l
s are determined by a di⁄erentiable function g (s) de￿ned over
the positive real line. Suppose that the covariance of an agent￿ s earnings with the earnings
of the young marginal newcomers in that city declines with age; i.e., g0 (s) < 0. Then,
abusing notation for ease of exposition, we write the change in hedging demand for local







g0(s) + log￿ ￿ ￿S￿s￿1g(s)
The ￿rst term represents the increasing insurance demand as the agent gets older due to ￿
declining with age. The second term is the e⁄ect of the declining number of periods of life
as the agent gets older. The ￿rst term increases with age; the second term is declines with
age.
Next we ask under what conditions do the two e⁄ects generate a hump-shaped pattern






g00(s) + 2log￿ ￿ ￿S￿s￿1g0(s) ￿ (log￿)
2 ￿ ￿S￿s￿1g(s)
25A su¢ cient condition for this expression to be negative is that g00 (s) be negative.
Assume that the shock-insulation parameter can be written as ￿l
s = k s￿1
S￿1, with k 2 [0;1]
(implying ￿l
1 = 0 and ￿l
s linearly increasing with age). If ￿ = 0:95, S = 60, and k = 1, the
hedging demand over the life-cycle is plotted in Figure 4.









This result o⁄ers another explanation ￿complementary to credit constraints ￿for why
home-ownership rates should be lower for younger people. Younger households do not
need much insurance against rent shocks because their earnings provides such insurance.
As they get older, earnings provide less insurance, and their hedging demand for home
ownership increases. Against this force is the fact that as an agent gets older, there are
fewer remaining periods of life, reducing the demand for insurance; this last point is made
by Sinai and Souleles (2005) who provide evidence of its empirical relevance.
5.3 Talent allocation
Does our market equilibrium have the potential to attain productive ine¢ ciency?
Let us begin by de￿ning and characterizing productive e¢ ciency. The economy￿ s total


















26We begin by characterizing the solution of the production maximization problem:
Proposition 6 The allocation of agents to cities that maximizes Y depends only on ", not
on ￿. An agent with " locates in city l if "l ￿ ￿ "l = maxm "m ￿ ￿ "m, where ￿ " is the unique
vector that guarantees that the mass of agents in every city equals the housing supply.
We can show that productive e¢ ciency is typically not achieved, except in very special
circumstances:
Proposition 7 Exactly one of the following statements is true:
(1) For all cities, ￿ pl = 0.
(2) The linear stationary equilibrium does not maximize Y .
Proposition 7 says that productive e¢ ciency is reached if and only if the expected return
on real estate is zero in every city. In that case, insurance against rent risk is available at
a cost of zero instead of a negative cost if the return is positive. Agents base their location
decisions exclusively on ", and output is maximized.
Expected returns on real estate are zero when: (1) The covariance matrix ￿ is such
that there is no systematic risk; (2) the local productivity shocks are uncorrelated and
the number of cities goes to in￿nity (there is still systematic risk coming from stocks).
Outside these restrictive conditions, the distribution of ￿ matters for location choices, and
the equilibrium allocation does not maximize expected product.
Of course, productive ine¢ ciency does not imply overall ine¢ ciency. Our market equi-
librium may be constrained-e¢ cient, given the insurance options available in the model.
Full insurance is o⁄ered only if local labor shocks ￿ and hence local house prices ￿ are
uncorrelated with systematic risk. Beyond that special case, local real estate prices carry
systematic risk, and location choices are a⁄ected by the desire of agents to cash in on risk
premiums.20
To reinforce the point of Proposition 7, we fully solve an example in closed-form. For
ease of exposition, we let S = 2, and restrict the stock market to a single stock. We assume
agents enjoy a constant insulation parameter ￿ over life. Each cohort is equally divided into
two types of agent: Type 0 agents have no insulation (￿ = 0), and type 1 agents have full
insulation, ￿ = 1.21 The distribution of agent-city match parameter is independent of agent
type, ", and uniform over the unit interval.
20Proving welfare theorems in our case is di¢ cult because the allocation space includes a discrete variable,
the allocation of agents to cities.
21This example is not, strictly speaking, included in our model because it violates the assumption that the
distribution of types is continuous and has full support. It demonstrates that the full-support assumption
is su¢ cient but not necessary for equilibrium existence.












The marginal city dwellers of type 0, ^ "0, and type 1, ^ "1, satisfy:
￿
^ "0 = ￿ r




The market clearing condition on the spatial market is (1￿^ "1+1￿^ "0)
2 = n, which yields a
solution for the rent premium as a function of the housing price discount:













































































2n ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
n ￿ 1






















































The last equation provides a solution for ￿ p as a function of parameters only. It is then easy























We therefore obtain a full characterization of the equilibrium.
Assume numerical values ￿ = n = z = ￿￿hs = 0:5 and ￿h = ￿s = ￿ = 1; the equilibrium
solution is ￿ r = ^ "0 = 0:65; ^ "1 = 0:35; ￿ p = 1:8; and ￿ q = 3:1. Maximizing output would have
required ^ "0 = ^ "1 = 0:5.; i.e., not enough type 0 agents locate in the city (agents with
"0 2 [0:5;0:65] are in the countryside instead of the city) and too many type 1 agents locate
in the city (agents with "1 2 [0:35;0:5] are in the city instead of the countryside).
285.4 Housing and stock indices
As in the CAPM, one can price any portfolio with respect to the market. In this model,
the relevant market is de￿ned by the adjusted market portfolio M, discussed in Corollary
3.
We can price a housing-only index with weights n￿R
1￿[n￿R] (called H) and a stock-only
index with weights z









Note that H can be interpreted as an index tracking the market portfolio of REITs. It is
the housing demand vector that is the same for all agents. It includes all houses that are
not owned by local residents for hedging purposes. The result in Corollary 8 is immediate
(by putting together the two return expressions above):





The corollary implies that, ceteris paribus, the di⁄erence between real estate returns and
stock returns is related to home-ownership rates. The higher the percentage of residential
property owned by local residents, the lower the returns on real estate.
Our model can also be used for predictions on stock returns. Often, the return of a stock
is computed according to a CAPM formula that takes into account stocks only. Namely,





In our setting, this expression is of course incorrect, because it does not take into account
the presence of housing. The correct expression is ￿ qk =
Cov(k;M)
V ar(M) ￿ pM. The ratio between the









5.5 Economies of agglomeration
So far we have assumed no production externalities (or amenity externalities, if one embraces
the amenity interpretation of our model). The model can be easily extended to incorporate
externalities. Most results still hold, except possibly uniqueness.




















where El is the collection of "l of other agents living in city l.
It is easy to see that Propositions 1 and 2 hold as stated. Proposition 4 can be restated






















As before, an agent locates in city l if and only if Ul = maxm Um.
An allocation of agents to cities is described by E =
￿
E1;:::;EL￿
. Hold E constant.
For every L-vector ^ r, the aggregate demand for location l is
￿l (^ r;E) =
Z
(";￿):￿ ul(";￿;El)￿^ rl=maxm(￿ um(";￿;Em)￿^ rm)
￿(";￿)d(";￿):
Proposition 9 An allocation E is part of a linear stationary equilibrium if and only if:





￿ ￿ rl = max
m
(￿ um (";￿;Em) ￿ ￿ rm)
and (2) ￿ r is the unique value of the vector ^ r such that ￿l (^ r;E) = nl in all cities.
Thus, the equilibrium characterization part of Proposition 4 is still valid. Existence of
an equilibrium will depend on the properties of the functions "l (￿). Moreover, as is well
known, agglomeration economies tend to lead to multiple equilibria.
5.6 Ownership only
In our frictionless model, there are no intrinsic advantages to owning or renting, and house-
holds are free to own any divisible amount of their home. Consider instead the extreme
case where renting is impossible. An agent can move to city l only if he or she buys one
house there. In this world, all houses are owned by residents, and all residents own exactly
one house. Agents can still invest in stocks.







We ￿rst characterize the optimal portfolio allocation:
30Proposition 10 Given a vector of stock premiums ￿ q, the optimal portfolio allocation for






























































The expected utility of an agent with parameters (";￿) if he or she locates in city l can be
expressed as










where ￿0, ￿1, ￿2, ￿s, and &s do not depend on (";￿) or on ￿ pl, and ￿1 > 0, ￿2 > 0.
The optimal portfolio allocation is di⁄erent from the allocation in the frictionless case.
Agents can no longer choose their real estate investment. They resort to stocks to insure
against the risk created by local productivity shocks. The extent to which stocks are helpful
in providing insurance depends on the covariance matrix ￿.
The amount of stock k that a certain agent demand is determined by two components:
￿ A classic speculative element (the same as in Proposition 1).














a measure of hedging demand and ￿cov
￿
￿k;￿l￿
determines the value of stock k as
a hedge for homes in city l. If dividend shocks are positively correlated with local
productivity shocks, the hedging demand is negative.
Proposition 11 characterizes asset pricing in the ownership only economy:
Proposition 11 For a given allocation of agents to cities, the excess return on stocks is
given by


















31Our asset pricing characterization now refers only to stocks. As real estate investment
is fully determined by location decisions, nothing can be said about house prices until
location decisions are discussed. Stock prices have two components: a classic beta-pricing
element, H￿￿￿z, and an additional part that depends on their use for hedging against local
productivity risk. This hedging component is proportional to ￿￿￿￿.
To understand the hedging component of the stock price, note that ￿ is a vector of
aggregate hedging demands, one for every city. The total hedging demand ￿l in city l
depends on the size of the city and how low the average shock-insulation parameter is for
residents of that city. The price of stock k depends on how its dividend shocks covary with
productivity shocks in all cities, weighted by the total hedging demand in every city.
To discuss the optimal location, let















For every L-vector ^ p, we can write the aggregate demand for location l as
￿l (^ p) =
Z
￿ ul(";￿)￿￿ pl=maxj=0;:::L(￿ uj(";￿)￿￿ pj)
￿(";￿)d(";￿):
Then, we have
Proposition 12 There is a linear stationary equilibrium. An agent with characteristics
(";￿) locates in city l if and only if
￿ ul (";￿) + ￿ pl = max
j=0;:::L
￿
￿ uj (";￿) + ￿ pj￿
and ￿ p is the unique value of the vector ^ p such that ￿l (^ p) = nl in all cities.







t ￿ ￿ pl:
As in the frictionless case, the equilibrium housing price is ultimately determined by the
preferences of the hyper-marginal residents. As before, the expected utility of an agent who
locates in city l depends only on the value of parameters for city l (i.e. "l and ￿l
s, for all
s).22 As in Proposition 4, there is a unique price vector for which aggregate demand equals
aggregate supply.





Choosing where to live amounts to choosing a zero-net price combination of a positive stream
of dividends (income, access to local amenities) and a negative stream of dividends (housing
costs). With this insight in mind, we approach the pricing of residential properties with a
model that combines a standard spatial equilibrium framework with a standard portfolio
choice and asset pricing framework. Housing rents are determined by market clearing in
the space market; every home in a populated city. The pricing of homes in each city and
the pricing of all other assets in the economy are determined by market clearing in the asset
market; all assets are held by investors.
Our model highlights signi￿cant interactions between the space market and the asset
market. For one, the location choice of households depends not only on expected income
minus rent (as in standard spatial equilibrium models) but also on the risk premium em-
bedded in the price of local homes and the risk each household faces as measured by the
covariance of its income with that of other city residents.
The pricing of assets depends on the location choices of the households. Who lives where
determines (1) the expected rents for residential properties everywhere, (2) their volatility
and covariance with other assets, and (3) the weight of residential properties from each
location in the adjusted market portfolio that is relevant for the pricing of all assets in the
economy.
Our results show the cost of ignoring the spatial nature of the economy when one
studies the allocation of households over space and the pricing of all assets. The theory
also generates new empirical questions with regard to the cross-sectional and time series
variations of households￿portfolios and returns to housing, and invites further re￿nements
to standard practices in the pricing of ￿nancial assets.
This represents just a ￿rst step toward a theory of spatial asset pricing. Our goal has
been to obtain a simple, tractable set-up to illustrate the links between location decisions
on the one hand and investment decisions and asset prices on the other. Future research
can explore, analytically or numerically, richer models of spatial asset pricing. Clearly, it
would be interesting to move beyond CARA utility functions. It would also be useful to
study real estate prices when moving costs are ￿nite. Finally, it would be useful to allow
for an elastic housing supply, perhaps even one that is determined endogenously through
the political process (see Ortalo-MagnØ and Prat, 2009, for a ￿rst step in this direction).
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Proof of Proposition 1
















































































































































































t+s+1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ qk
￿
37because ￿l











































































































































































































t;t+s for all j 6= l.





































































































































































Proof of Proposition 2
















for s = 0;:::;S ￿ 1. Since all agents have the same portfolio and there is a measure one of agents in












































It is then easy to see that the total housing demand in city l due to the hedging motive is SRl,
where Rl is de￿ned as in the proposition.
The supply of houses minus the hedging demand in every city is S (n ￿ R). The housing market




S￿1~ at;t = S (n ￿ R):
Hence











































































































































































The proof for k follows similar lines and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4
It is immediate to see that a solution to ￿ (^ r) = n constitutes a linear stationary equilibrium; no
agent wants to change location, by de￿nition rl
t = y
j
t + ￿ rl, and the conditions for Propositions 1 and
2 are satis￿ed.
To prove existence, note that ￿l (^ r) is continuous in ^ r and that lim^ rl!￿1 ￿l (^ r) = 1 and
lim^ rl!1 ￿l (^ r) = 0.
To prove that prices and rents are uniquely determined given an allocation of agents to cities,
suppose that the system ￿ (^ r) = n has two distinct solutions ￿ r and ￿ r0. Assume without loss of
generality that there are a non-empty set of cities ~ L for which (￿ r0)
l < ￿ rl. The set of agents who









￿ uj (";￿) ￿ ^ rj￿
￿
Note, however, that this set must become strictly larger when ￿ r is replaced by ￿ r0, because all elements
￿ ul (";￿) ￿ ^ rl on one side become strictly larger and all elements ￿ uj (";￿) ￿ ^ rj on the other side do
not become larger. Hence, more agents will want to locate in cities in ~ L, but this is impossible as
the mass of agents who locate in ~ L must sum up to
P
l2~ L nl in both solutions.
40Proof of Proposition 5
Note that














s+1 are the same for all agents and the ~ " are uniformly distributed, we write
￿l (^ r) =
Z
~ ":~ "l￿^ rl=maxm(~ "m￿^ rm)
d~ "
This problem is symmetric in l. Hence, the unique solution to ￿l (^ r) = 1
LN for l = 1;:::;L must
be symmetric in l, namely ￿ rl = ￿ r. This means that in every period, the mass of young agent who
locates in the countryside is ￿0 (^ r) = ￿ rL. This implies ￿ r = (1 ￿ N)
1
L. According to equation (4),the
equilibrium rent is given by














Proof of Proposition 6
Consider any allocation of agents to cities. Suppose an agent with
￿
"l;"m￿
is allocated to city l






is allocated to m. Swapping agents does not increase total




￿ "m ￿ ("m)
0 :
If this holds true for every agent, one can ￿nd a unique vector ￿ " such that the condition in the
statement is satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 7
According to Proposition 4, in a linear stationary equilibrium agents are assigned to cities according
to













Suppose that an agent with a certain (";￿) locates in city l. The next preferred city is m, and the
utility di⁄erence between the two cities is given by
D = ￿ ul (";￿) ￿ ￿ um (";￿);
where D is su¢ ciently low. Consider another agent with ("0;￿0) that is identical to (";￿) except
that ("0)

















s ￿ ￿. Given a positive ￿ pl,
it is always possible to ￿nd ￿ and ￿ such that ￿ ul ("0;￿0) < ￿ um ("0;￿0). By the assumption that ￿ has
full support, agents with (";￿) and ("0;￿0) exist. The sum of expected outputs of the two agents
would be higher if the agents switch cities.
The only time this cannot be done is when ￿ pl is the same for all cities. In that case, it is easy
to see that agents choose location in order to maximize "l.
41Proof of Proposition 9






￿ ￿ rl as a criterion to locate and rents must equate demand and supply. The argument
for the uniqueness of ￿ rl (given E) is unchanged from the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider an agent born in period t with parameters (";￿) who locates in city l. His or her wealth





































t￿￿ pl. This implies pl
t+S = 1
1￿￿yl




t + ￿t+1 + ::: + ￿t+S￿1 + ￿t+S
￿
￿











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ pl￿
:



























































































































































































































































































































































































































"l + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




















































"l + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ pl + ￿ q0￿￿1
￿￿
H













































































































































￿S (1 ￿ ￿)
> 0
Proof of Proposition 11



































































































































































































￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿L ￿0
:
Proof of Proposition 12




46but this is equivalent to























































The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4, and it is omitted. Note that in our
conjecture we treat ￿ rl and ￿ plasymmetrically, one with a positive sign, the other with a negative
sign. This explains the di⁄erence in signs for each of these two terms between Proposition 4 and the
Proposition 12.
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